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he Kurdish region lies in one of the centres of ongoing global 
conflicts and has its own, home-grown disputes. Rich oil fields 
and water sources are abundant, and the living areas of Kurds, 
Arabs, Turks, Turkmen, Persians, Azeris and others overlap. All the 
countries where the Kurds live (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey) are heavily 
mined, mainly along state borders, with mines generally imported from 
Western countries.
Despite the strong national ambitions of various Kurdish organisa-
tions since the 1940s, a Kurdish national state does not yet exist. In each 
of the four states with a Kurdish minority, Kurds clamour for national, 
cultural and democratic rights. Depending on both the legal and politi-
cal situation, these outcries differ in kinds and methods from state to 
state. Some Kurds form human rights groups and committees; others 
promote Kurdish culture through cultural associations or join ethni-
cally based political parties. Frequently, political campaigning occurs 
alongside armed struggle. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has been 
fighting the Turkish Army for more than 20 years. The situation dif-
fers in northern Iraq, where a coalition of Kurdish parties—the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party—have formed 
a regional government with their Peshmerga1 controlling the territory 
since the Persian Gulf War in 1991.
The Kurdish question tends to be “exported” because there isn’t a 
common or coherent agenda among Kurdish organisations and the 
states in which they reside. Civilians have left, either freely or by force, 
areas of Kurdish resistance, and Kurdish guerrillas and political parties 
have been driven to neighbouring countries. In recent years, and espe-
cially since the start of the Iraq War in 2003, northern Iraq has become 
the stronghold for the PKK of Turkey and for various Kurdish groups 
of Iran.
Conflicts both with “global players” and internally are still “hot”—or 
at least latent—and far from being resolved. Ongoing conflicts, varying 
state legislation, and the differing interests and agendas of the involved 
states and non-state actors define the condition of mine action for the 
Kurdish region. Of the states with Kurdish populations, only Turkey and 
Iraq have signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention,2 and since 
parts of the territories are controlled by armed NSAs, NSA engagement 
is essential for the mine ban and general clearance. The highly devel-
oped satellite media of various Kurdish NSAs can play an important 
role in mine-risk education in affected rural regions; therefore, Geneva 
Call has been working since its establishment in 2000 to engage Kurdish 
NSAs in dialogue.
Syria: A Lack of Mine Action 
Eight to 10 percent (around 1.5 million people) of the Syrian popula-
tion is Kurdish. A major reason for tension between the Arab majority 
and the Kurds stems from a resettlement project in the late 1950s—an 
“Arab belt” was created against a contiguous Kurdish region across the 
Syrian-Turkish border. Additionally, an estimated 120,000 Kurds lost 
their citizenship as part of the 1962 census, a number that has grown to 
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more than 300,000 Kurds today. The Syrian state recognises the problem 
and President Bashar al-Asad has announced willingness to renation-
alise the stateless Syrian Kurds.
Citizenship is crucial to Kurdish demands, which have been under-
lined by occasional demonstrations. Kurdish political parties, like all 
ethnically based parties, are illegal in Syria, but some are tolerated. For a 
decade, Syria was an important location for the Kurdish leaders from its 
neighbouring states. In 1988, Jalal Talabani, Iraq’s current president and 
then leader of the PUK, fled to Syria. In the 1990s, the PKK of Turkey had 
its political headquarters in Damascus until Syria, under heavy Turkish 
pressure, forced the PKK leader Abdullah Öcallan to leave in 1998.
As Syria is not a State Party to the Ottawa Convention, there is no 
official report about mine use there. According to the Electronic Mine 
Information Network and confirmed by a Syrian nongovernmental 
organisation, mines have allegedly been placed along the Syrian border 
with Turkey, which is mainly a Kurdish region. Some cases of mine- 
and unexploded ordnance-amputations come from the Syrian-Turkish 
border. Mine action in Syria is focussed on the town of Quneitra and its 
surroundings in the Golan Heights. There is no mine-risk education or 
specific survivor assistance in the Syrian Kurdish areas, and there is no 
demining there, either.
Iran: Ethnic Clashes
Around eight million Kurds live in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
mainly in four northwestern provinces, but also in major cities outside the 
Kurdish region. Kurdish ambitions and demands, raised by various NSAs, 
are intertwined with a more general opposition to the Islamic Republic, 
especially as the Kurdish society tends to be more secular than the current 
Islamic state. In 2005 and 2006, at least 17 people were killed during pro-
tests and clashes in Kurdish towns, according to Human Rights Watch.3
The Kurdish region is severely affected by landmines and UXO. 
During the Iran-Iraq War,4 some 12–16 million landmines were emplaced 
in Iran, covering more than four million hectares (15,444 square miles).5 
The contaminated area was reduced to 24,000 square kilometres (9,266 
square miles) following clearance of 18,000 square kilometres (6,950 
square miles) between 1988 and 2003.6 A mine problem also results 
from an internal Iranian conflict. Shortly after the Islamic Revolution, 
an offensive began in the north of the country against Kurdish rebels. At 
that time, the Iranian Army allegedly planted an unknown number of 
mines around their barracks and compounds to prevent Kurdish rebels 
from attacking. 
Provinces with Kurdish populations—Kurdistan, Western Azer-
baijan, Ilam and Kermanshah—all lay on the heavily mined border with 
Iraq but are less affected than Khuzestan in the south. Between 1988 
and 2002, there were 6,765 landmine casualties in Iran.7,2 Casualties 
were recorded in Kurdistan, with 437 killed and 1,720 injured; Western 
Azerbaijan, with 198 killed and 192 injured; Ilam, with 730 killed 
and 250 injured; Kermanshah, with 874 killed and 522 injured; and 
Khuzestan, with 601 killed and 1,241 injured.
The Landmine Monitor reports increas-
ing mine action in recent years. For instance, 
the Republic of Iran Mine Action Center 
developed a 10-year plan to eliminate all 
landmines in Iran by 2015. According to 
the plan, Kurdistan province would have 
been completely cleared by March 2006 and 
Western Azerbaijan province would have 
been demined by March 2007; however, the 
LM has not received any information about 
the progress made so far. MRE is focussed on 
Kurdistan province. An MRE video was pro-
duced in Kurdish with Persian subtitles. From 
2002 to April 2005, 115 of 891 urban schools 
and 523 of 2,236 rural schools received MRE.8 
This program was reviewed during 2005; it was 
found that 70 percent of the students retained 
knowledge of landmines and that there was 
an 80-percent reduction in mine-related inci-
dents in Kurdistan compared to 2004. During 
2005, the program focussed on shepherds and 
schoolchildren. However, there seems to be 
almost no MRE in the Kurdish regions except 
in Kurdistan province.
Of the armed Kurdish NSAs, the Demo-
cratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) 
and Komalah Party-Iranian Kurdistan have 
suspended their armed struggle for the time 
being. PDKI unilaterally declared its renun-
ciation of the use of anti-personnel mines and 
signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment for 
Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti-Personnel 
Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action7 
on 4 December 2007. Komalah, approached 
by Geneva Call, also shares this position (at 
least verbally). Both parties are members 
of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples 
Organization, which adopted a resolution of 
committing to a total mine ban and calling 
on all NSAs to sign Geneva Call’s Deed of 
Commitment in October 2006. 
One NSA still fighting is based in the Iraqi 
Qandeel Mountains; the Party for Freedom 
and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK) launches doz-
ens of guerrilla attacks in Iran. The Iranian 
Army reacts with frequent artillery shelling 
of the Qandeel Mountains. The PJAK is widely 
considered a wing of the PKK of Turkey. In 
contrast to the PKK, however, it has made no 
statement on the use of APMs or mine action.
Turkey: No-go Areas and Commitments
More than 15 million Kurds live in Turkey. 
The armed struggle of the PKK—today called 
Kurdistan People’s Congress Kongra-Gel with 
its military wing People’s Defence Forces 
HPG—began in 1984. The first period of 
this long armed conflict ended in 1999 when 
PKK leader Abdullah Öcallan was arrested. 
Approximately 30,000 people died in this war. 
Millions in the Kurdish northeast of the coun-
try were displaced and fled to the urban cen-
tres and cities in the rest of the country. Some 
3,000 Kurdish villages were evacuated. The 
Turkish security forces burned many villages. 
After evacuation, “mines were laid around 
villages, military installations, border areas, 
water springs, feeding grounds,  pathways and 
mountain caves.”8 The PKK itself admitted to 
sporadically using AP mines until 1999.
After Öcallan’s arrest, many of the 10,000 
PKK fighters fled to Iraqi Kurdistan. Since 
June 2004, when the PKK ended a unilateral 
ceasefire declared in 1999, it has been wag-
ing a guerrilla war from its headquarters in 
the northern Iraqi Qandeel Mountains. The 
Turkish state reacts with heavy troop concen-
trations at its border with Iraq and occasional 
cross-border operations.
In May 2006, Turkey reported under 
Article 79 of the Ottawa Convention a total 
of 984,313 emplaced mines, of which 164,497 
were anti-vehicle mines on the Syrian bor-
der and 819,816 were anti-personnel mines 
in an unspecified number of areas.10 Turkey 
acceded to the Ottawa Convention in 2003.8 
The PKK stated in 2005 that it had banned AP 
mines, and in 2006, its representatives signed 
Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment. There is 
no confirmed use of AP mines by either side 
since they declared the ban. However, the PKK 
admits the use of command-detonated mines.
According to the LM, in 2005, the 
Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey identified 
at least 220 new mine/UXO casualties in 62 
incidents, including 68 people killed and 152 
injured.6 This figure represents a significant 
increase, compared to the 168 mine/UXO 
casualties reported in 2004 and 67 in 2003. 
These numbers may not accurately reflect the 
incidence of mine/UXO casualties, however. 
Turkey reported 194 military mine casual-
ties—39 killed and 155 injured—for 2005.10 
This number, quoted in the LM 2006, might 
include military casualties from command-
detonated mines amongst AP mine casualties. 
Additionally, it seems that many of the mili-
tary casualties reported are not mine/UXO 
but conflict casualties.
Turkish media and security forces regularly 
accuse the PKK of causing the incidents 
T
A Kurdish survivor receives treatment. 
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY OF GENEVA CALL
This article discusses the intricate global and internal conflicts that plague the Kurdish 
region with emphasis on the profound impact these conflicts have on mine action in 
this area of the Middle East.
by Armin Köhli [ Geneva Call ]
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by planting new mines, which the PKK 
denies. Field research done in the Kurdish 
Dicle district, which was conducted by the 
Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey on behalf 
of the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines to 
examine incidents in 2007, suggests a different 
picture. Local communities reported that the 
incidents were caused by “old” mines laid by 
the security forces. The victims are mostly 
poor Kurdish villagers who were evacuated 
in 1991–1992 and have now returned to their 
villages. According to them, many minefields 
are insufficiently marked or completely 
unmarked. The returning villagers are in 
danger when going to their fields, vineyards, 
gardens and water resources. Additionally, 
MRE is almost non-existent in the affected 
regions, except for some warning signs by the 
Turkish Army in some areas.
The Turkish government plans to issue a 
tender for commercial companies to demine 
areas along the Syrian border.10 Clearance of 
all mined areas on the Syrian border would 
cost around US$600 million and would be 
undertaken by companies that would use the 
land for agriculture in order to create new 
employment opportunities in the region. 
Should this plan work out, it would confiscate 
a 510-kilometre-long (317-mile-long) stretch 
of mostly fertile land and grant it to big com-
panies, potentially hindering the small farm-
ers from going back to their villages, unless 
they become low-paid wage workers.
Iraq: Unifying Mine Action
Some 5.5 million people live in the 
Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, of which 
four million are Kurds. The Landmine 
Monitor puts it clearly: “The Kurdish gover-
norates, some of the most contaminated areas 
of the world with 1,428 affected communities, 
contend with thousands of tactical minefields 
on the borders with Iran and Turkey and fur-
ther contamination along the Green Line, 
the former frontline between Kurdish forces 
and Saddam Hussein’s Army, as well as UXO 
across all three governorates.”11 Four thou-
sand out of 5,000 villages were destroyed dur-
ing the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, 
and many of them were mined after the evacu-
ation. Between 1991 and 2000 alone, 10,997 
mine/UXO casualties were reported in six 
governorates of northern Iraq; 3,697 people 
were killed and 7,300 injured.
The first Kurdish rebellion in modern 
Iraq started in 1961 under the leadership of 
Mustafa Barzani, the father of today’s Regional 
President Masud Barzani. In 1970, the autono-
mous Kurdistan region was established for 
the first time in an agreement with the central 
government in Baghdad. But from then until 
1991, its status was disputed and subject to 
violent conflicts. The most infamous event in 
this series of conflicts was the “Anfal” cam-
paign by Saddam Hussein’s forces with the use 
of chemical weapons and a poison-gas attack 
against the Kurdish town of Halabja.
Following an insurgency, in the aftermath 
of the first Iraq conflict, and with military 
support by the United States and its allies, the 
Kurdish parties Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
and Kurdistan Democratic Party took control 
of the region in October 1991. After the start 
of the Iraq War in 2003, the Kurdistan region 
became a semi-autonomous, federally recog-
nised, political entity. However, the Kurdistan 
region remains part of the Federal Republic 
of Iraq, and PUK leader Jalal Talabani is 
the President of Iraq. Both the PUK and the 
KDP, forming a coalition now in the region, 
are committed to mine action. Even before 
the invasion of Iraq by the United States and 
its allies in 2003, as de facto authorities in 
northern Iraq, they signed and implemented 
Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment in 2002. 
The two existing mine-action centres in Arbil 
and Suleymaniyah are conducting demining 
and MRE programmes on a large scale. Mines 
Advisory Group, since 1992, and Norwegian 
People’s Aid, since 1997, have been conduct-
ing such programmes, too. On a small scale, 
the PPK is also demining for humanitarian 
purposes and carries out ad hoc MRE in the 
Qandeel Mountains.
The Kurdish Parliament passed a law uni-
fying the two existing mine-action centres 
into the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency, 
something it had done even before Iraq recently 
Collected UXO in Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007.
joined the Ottawa Convention. A unified 
mine-action agency for the whole region is a 
big step toward further strengthening of mine 
action and toward a mine-free Kurdistan.
Conclusion
While the situation varies in each of the 
four states with Kurdish populations—Syria, 
Iran, Turkey and Iraq—Kurds are demand-
ing rights on every level in the midst of local 
and global conflicts. These conflicts create the 
need for organised mine action and Kurdish 
regional legislation to protect the local popu-
lations from UXO and landmines. 
See Endnotes, page 110
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he Middle East and North Africa region is affected by mines/
ERW because of the many wars and conflicts this region wit-
nessed since the 1940s through today. Historically and geo-
graphically, the mine/ERW problem began in MENA around the end of 
World War II in North Africa, and continued through the invasion of 
Iraq by Coalition Forces in 2003. In addition, a number of internal con-
flicts and wars have resulted in contamination. These internal conflicts 
have taken place in: Oman (1964–1975), Lebanon (1975–1990), Yemen 
(1994) and Algeria (1991–present). Securing borders and strategic loca-
tions are other reasons for existing mines in Algeria, Egypt, Israel 
Jordan, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and maybe other countries.
Tons of Explosives Available for Use
There are 15 affected countries and territories in MENA contami-
nated with millions of mines and ERW. Some of those countries have 
declared the numbers of mines and ERW in their lands, though others 
have not as they do not know how many remain. All affected countries, 
however, have projections based on estimated affected land and previous 
demining operations. 
Regional projections vary greatly, totaling 52–66 million mines and 
ERW. The estimated contaminations of each country are as follows:
• Algeria: 2,783,555
• Egypt: 21,600,000 (only 20–25 percent are mines)
• Iran: 12–16 million
• Iraq: 8–12 million before the 2003 Coalition invasion, which 
surely increased those numbers
• Israel: 260,000, emplanted by Israel for security reasons
• Jordan: 203,000
• Kuwait: small number after clearance of 5–7 million
• Lebanon: 406,000 mines and 4 million ERW, the majority of 
which are cluster submunitions left after the last Israeli conflict 
with Hezbollah/Lebanon in July and August 2006
• Libya: 1.5–3 million
• Syria: 500,000
• Tunisia: 3,240 mines and an unknown number of ERW
• Yemen: 150,000 to 2 million
In Oman, Palestine and Western Sahara, the numbers of mines and 
ERW are unknown.
Given the fact that the aforementioned mines and ERW differ in type 
and composition, the amount of live explosives they contain differs, too. 
On average, the live explosives can be estimated at 0.25 grams (0.88 
Landmines/Explosive Remnants of War and the War
on Terrorism in the MENA
by Ayman Sorour 
[ Protection Against Armaments & Consequences ]
This article looks at the relationship between the existing landmine and explosive remnants of war1 problem in 
the Middle East and North Africa, and terrorist activities in the area by explaining the scope of the mine/ERW 
problem in the region; the huge availability of explosives for use in illegal activities, particularly terrorism; and 
the case of Algeria and Egypt being affected by recent terrorist acts.
T ounces) per item,2 which means the quantity of available live explosives in MENA is between 13,151 and 16,489 metric tons (16,229 U.S. tons). These explosives are not secured and cannot be secured due to the fact 
that the large part of lands where they are found is not easily accessible 
for political reasons, as in Iraq, or because no survey has been com-
pleted, as in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. 
The first question that may come to mind is: How easy is it to clear 
such mines and ERW, considering the very low level of practical experi-
ence of those who do it? The answer is that it is undoubtedly risky and 
dangerous work, but in some affected countries, mines and ERW can 
be found on the land’s surface, like the way the Iraqi Army planted 
landmines in Kuwait. Previous munitions stores and abandoned arms 
caches, such as the many the Iraqi Army left behind after the initial 
Coalition Forces invasion in 2003, are also obvious locations. In other 
places, locals may have little experience to help them clear mines and 
ERW. For instance, Polisario said mines it has are those it cleared from 
the Moroccan defensive walls built to divide Western Sahara between 
them and Morocco. Consequently, the possibility of mine and ERW 
clearance by a person with a very low level of experience is a reality. 
Explosives for Free and Illegal Activities
It is not known when explosives from mines and ERW were first 
used in illegal activities, but it is not a recent occurrence. Explosives 
from mines and ERW have historically been used in fishing and min-
ing operations, providing a cheap and easy method for both activities. 
Some Bedouins in remote areas use these explosives to secure their pri-
vate properties from thieves or to secure their drug plants from others, 
including police forces. 
Since 2003, explosives from mines and ERW have been used in ter-
rorist acts in MENA. In Iraq, a 2003 attack against the United Nations 
headquarters in Baghdad resulted in the death of the U.N. envoy to Iraq 
and the death and injury of more than a dozen others. This terrorist 
attack was one of the biggest uses of that type of explosive; this use of 
explosives continues in Iraq. Similar terrorist acts occurred in Sinai, 
Egypt, in October 2004, July 2005 and in April 2006. The government 
admitted that explosives in those terrorist acts were taken from mines 
and ERW. Although the Algerian government did not announce the ori-
gin of explosives used by the two car bombers in April 2007 who attacked 
the government building and police station in Algiers, and a suicide car 
bomber in Lakhdaria (80 kilometers [50 miles] from Algiers), explosives 
may have come from mines/ERW. Recently in Yemen, the government 
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